D octors should not be forced by any law of the state or by any dictate of morality to stand by, helpless and hands tied, and to go just so far, and no further, and not far enough in using whatever means are proportionate and effective in bringing peace and release from suffering to dying patients when they are in agony. But doctors are often forced by outdated law, by fear, and by faulty perceptions to do precisely that: to let people suffer.
Last year, in a discussion about whether some patients suffer so much that they need to sleep before they die, I made a bold statement about the emancipation principle of palliative medicine and care. I said there was very little controversy about the requirement of this principle or about the scope of action it accords a physician, namely: spare no , scientific or clinical effort and means to free dying persons from the agonies that invade, dominate, and shrivel their consciousness, that leave them no psychic space to be present to themselves and their loved ones, that rob them of even the briefest last moments of tranquility and equanimity (2) . I was altogether too sanguine, too out of touch with reality when I made that statement. There is extensive uncertainty, confusion, and controversy among physicians, nurses, hospital executives, lawyers, and judges" about what the physician's mandate to relieve suffering really permits and ordains. Arguments abound, the failure to make careful and critically important distinctions is prevalent, words are misused, and faulty descriptions pre-judge the moral perception and evaluation of what knowledgeable, competent, and sensitive physicians are doing when they dare to bring agonizing patients the peace for which they are begging.
WHEN THE lAW IS OUTDATED AND OBSCURE
Many physicians believe that they have to be courageous and daring indeed to go far enough with their use of drugs to relieve suffering effectively. When the law is outdated and obscure, physicians who are medically and ethically up-to-date do have reason' to fear being accused of, and prosecuted for, practicing euthanasia when they rightfully and professionally bring dying people to the peace, even the deeply sleepful peace, that the dying request and deserve. The answer to this justifiable fear, and to the cases of uncontrolled suffering it causes, is indeed, and in part, a change in the law; a change that will bring "Suffering exists, makes itself known, and warrants relief." Eric T. Cassell (1) the law into harmony with the realities of today's palliative medicine. The needed change does not require legalization of euthanasia. Canada offers a very instructive example of physician uncertainty and fear in the face of outdated and unclarified law. As I write this editorial, the case of a 24-year-old woman in a Quebec City hospital is before the courts. Nancy B. is afflicted with Landry-Guillain-Barre syndrome, her respiratory muscles have deteriorated, and she has been in hospital on respiratory support for two and a half years. Nancy can do nothing by and for herself and she has repeatedly asked that the respirator be disconnected so that her condition and nature can take its course. Nancy is refusing respirator treatment and support because it is futile. Oh yes, the respirator will keep her lungs going, but it will never get her going again. This and allied treatments will not cure her nor will the respirator give her back that minimal power to function that would make her life bearable and meaningful. The respirator is really prolonging, and she can rightfully argue, intensifying her suffering.
However, Nancy's doctor and hospital authorities are uncertain if they are legally authorized to honor Nancy's request and to disconnect the respirator. They are fearful of the potential consequences.
This fear of legal consequences is not misguided or groundless. The Criminal Code of Canada was written before modern medical life-prolongation technology was available or today's palliative medicine was known. Certain sections of the Criminal Code, as they now stand, definitely do place physicians in the following dilemma: eitberto hope that the law as it now stands does not actually mean what it seems to say and to practice medicine in the patient's best interests; orto assume that the law as written intends to say what it does and to practice a type of defensive medicine, a practice designed to minimize the likelihood of legal problems even at the cost of the patient's best interests (3) .
It is an ironic testimony to the shortness of human memory, to the disarray of education in medical ethics and medical law, and to the pusillanimity of legislators that the Canadian Law Reform Commission's three highly intelligent proposals, put forth nearly ten years ago, to amend the sections of the Criminal Code regarding a physician's duty to prolong life anda physician's mandate to relieve suffering have been either forgotten or ignored. 3 
• •
Two of the Law Reform Commission's proposed amendments are directly relevant to the case of Nancy B. The Commission stated that the Criminal Code shall not be interpreted as requiring a physician:
• to continue to administer or to undertake medical treatment against the expressed wishes of the person for whom such treatment is intended; or • to continue to administer or undertake medical treatment, when such treatment has become therapeutically useless in the circumstances and is not in the best interests of the person for whom it is intended (4).
William ].Curran, a commentator on matters of medicine and law for the New EnglandJournal of Medicine, has used the word wisdom to characterize these proposed amendments to Canada's Criminal Code (5) . The Commission's ideas are wise because they offer a solid legal foundation for doctors to practice humane and ethically sensitive medicine without fear of prosecution and its consequences. This kind of medical practice has nothing to do with euthanasia.
Nancy's request that her respirator be disconnected is not suicidal nor is it a request for euthanasia. Her request is a refusal to be enslaved to a machine and is, at the same time, an affirmation that to be a human being, and to be bearably alive, requires more than being just a functioning brain. The doctor's real ethical question in this case is not: "Am I justified in disconnecting the respirator?" but rather "Am I justified in continuing respirator support against the patient's lucid and stable refusal?" The patient's answer, and the Law Reform Commission's answer, is "No!".
TITRATING RELIEF FROM PAIN AND

SUFFERING IS NOT EUTHANASIA
There are always more, usually many more, than two sides to any story, and our moral judgment of events depends mightily upon how we perceive and describe them. If we describe a physician's efforts to manage pain and relieve suffering as "hastening death" or as "euthanasia", we immediately anchor the practice in the realm of legally and morally dubious acts.
Physicians have a professional and a moral mandate to use every proportionate means available to afford dying people the release from suffering that they desireand for which they so often have to begso that they can die in tranquility and not in knots of agony. Doctors carry a: social mandate to relieve suffering, not so much because suffering is bad, which it is, but primarily because it is human beings who are suffering (6) . Relief from suffering is the moral act of respect for humanity and for human dignity.
Constant, wracking, and mind-twisting pain separates a person from himself and from loved ones. It shatters human integrity. Adequate control of pain is, then, an essential part of living an integrated life. Induction of the neuronal tranquility that is prerequisite for an Integrated human life, and for dying as an integrated human being, is the goal that should govern both the choice and combination of analgesics as well as the route, dosage, and frequency of administration. It is indeed foolish to deny patients relief from suffering because of foolish fears or uncertain concerns that analgesics may shorten life (7) . Here also the Law Reform Commission of Canada is both wise and reassuring when it proposes that the possible effect of analgesics on a dying person's length of life is no basis whatsoever for holding physicians criminally liable when they administer palliative medicine to relieve suffering (8) . A dying patient receiving frequent injections for pain control will eventually die afterone of these injections. No one can really say the patient died because of the last injection (9) . If a shortening of lifedoes result from dosages of analgesics required to relieve pain, this does not mean that the doctor, or the nurse, hastened the patient's death. It simply means that the patient's weakened body could no longer tolerate the palliative care required for a tolerable life.
Careful titration of care, of course, requires more than the control of pain. Such care is the servant of compassion, of scientifically guided compassion, that knows how to manage fear, delirium, edema, nausea, vomiting, dyspnea, and a host of other symptoms (10) . It is care of this sort that can transform potentially terminal panic into an event of peaceful, even if deeply sad, farewell.
Doctors must not be barred by any law of the state or by any dictate of morality from freeing the dying from their terminal agony. When the law is outdated or obscure on palliative medicine, the law should be changed or clarified. When doctors are unclear about their mandate to relieve suffering, they should be educated, rapidly and expertly. We should be vigorously promoting these needed clarifications of law, and programs of education in palliative medicine and palliative care, rather than jumping on the clanging bandwagon of hysteric pleas for the decriminalization of euthanasia.
